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This Reply Brief makes reference to two statutes which are 
relevant to the issues discussed herein. The first is found in the 
Utah contractors licensing laws. Although the statute has been re-
enacted under several titles, chapters and sections, the trial 
court referred to this statute as Utah Code Annotated Section 58-
50-11 (This statutory provision has a long and varied history. 
This provision originated as a common-law rule created by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The common-law rule was enacted in 1981 as Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58A-1-26, and remained such during the time 
relevant to this action. The Section was re-enacted in 1985 as 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-la-13. Section 58A-la-13 was re-
enacted in 1987 as Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. Finally, 
Section 58-50-11 was re-enacted in 1989 as Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-55-17. The remainder of this Reply Brief will make 
reference to Section 58-50-11 since this is the version the lower 
court considered and upon which its decision is based.). Section 
58-50-11 states: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or 
maintain any action in any court of the state 
for collection of compensation for the per-
formance of any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
In addition to Section 58-50-11, on February 12, 1990, the 
Utah Court of Appeals decided a case involving recovery of 
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compensation as an unlicensed engineer. Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-22-20 (1953 as enacted in 1955) prohibits recovery of 
compensation by an unlicensed engineer similar to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-50-11. Section 58-22-20 states, in pertinent 
part: 
[n]o person shall bring or maintain an action 
in the courts of this state for enforcement of 
any contract or the recovery of any sums due 
in connection with the practice of engineering 
or land surveying in this state as defined 
herein, without alleging and proving that he 
was duly authorized to practice under the 
provisions of this act . . . . 
The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the equitable exceptions 
to the common law general rule against recovery and which were 
created in the context of contractor licensing allowed the 
unlicensed engineer to recover despite the codification of the 
general rule in Section 58-22-20. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the Defendant's assertions in its Brief, there was 
only one basis for the trial court's decision to dismiss the 
Plaintiff's Complaint. The dismissal was only on the basis that 
the Plaintiff could not maintain this action pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-50-11. The other grounds and issues raised 
by the Defendant as bases for the trial court' s decision did not 
actually form the basis of the trial court's decision. Therefore, 
they are not properly before this Court an should be disregarded. 
The trial court could not have based its dismissal of 
Plaintiff's Complaint upon any alleged failure to comply with 
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contractual notice requirements since there are significant 
disputed material facts which would prevent the case from 
disposition on a motion for summary judgment. Further, the trial 
court could not have based its dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint 
upon any alleged failure to allege that it was licensed in the 
Complaint since the application of the equitable common law 
exceptions would allow an unlicensed contractor to recover in 
certain circumstances. Thus, while the general rule does require 
allegation and proof that a plaintiff is licensed, allegation and 
proof of licensure may not be required under the equitable common 
law exceptions. Therefore, allegation and proof of licensure, or 
exemption therefrom under the equitable common law exceptions, may 
be made at some other time in the proceeding than in the complaint. 
Further, as discussed in its initial Brief, Plaintiff asserts that 
the licensing requirements do not apply to an action to compel 
arbitration. 
The equitable common law exceptions to the application of the 
general rule against recovery do apply to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-50-11 as required by the rules of statutory construction 
and as stated by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The rules of statutory construction dictate that the 
equitable common law exceptions to the general rule against 
recovery apply to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. Thus, 
absent specific intent to the contrary, a codification of an 
existing common law rule will be interpreted and applied in the 
same manner as the common law rule. Furthermore, the decisions by 
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the Utah Supreme Court and The Utah Court of Appeals hold that the 
equitable common law exceptions to the general rule against 
recovery apply to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. 
ARGUMENT 
Initially, the Defendant's concerns over issues of fact as 
stated in its Brief is an indication that this case involves many 
disputed issues of material fact which should have precluded 
granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and precluded 
the dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint. This problem is made 
more acute by the fact that the hearing on the motions was 
unreported and this Court does not have the benefit of the 
arguments and proffers presented therein. The Defendant has chosen 
to attempt to overcome this problem by submitting documents in the 
Addendum to its Brief which were not submitted to the trial court 
and which do not appear in the record. 
Never-the-less, viewing the facts in the best light for the 
Plaintiff leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the granting of 
summary judgment against the Plaintiff and dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Complaint was improper. At the very least, it shows 
that significant issues of material fact exist which should not and 
cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. 
Defendant has cited the case of Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone 
Agency, 204 P.2d 37 (Calif. 1949) for the proposition that the 
action filed by the Plaintiff is an action for compensation 
although it claims no monetary award but only the enforcement of 
the arbitration provision of the subject subcontracts. It should 
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be noted that the case is from a jurisdiction other than Utah and, 
therefore, has no precedential value for this Court. Further the 
case is over forty years old and does not reflect the modern trend 
of favoring arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism, as discussed in the Plaintiff's initial Brief. Finally, 
the cited case does not reflect the stated strong Utah public 
policy favoring arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 
Where the parties to a contract have agreed to an alternative 
method of dispute resolution, the Court should not impose a statute 
that on its face only prohibits "actions for compensation.,f Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 should be construed strictly to 
allow an action to compel arbitration. 
I. THERE WAS ONLY ONE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO 
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
DEFENDANT DO NOT FORM THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT fS DECISION 
AND ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
In its brief to this Court, Defendant has grossly misstated 
the basis of the trial court's decision in ruling against the 
Plaintiff. Defendant's Brief at 1 and 13. Defendant erroneously 
states that the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint on 
three grounds while, in fact, the trial court based its decision 
on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment upon only one ground. 
The trial court, in its minute entry dated March 15, 1989, simply 
stated that "Defendant's [sic] Motion is granted. The Court agrees 
with defendant's [sic] argument that because the plaintiff did not 
have a valid contractor's license it is precluded by statute from 
maintaining this action." Record at 138. Further, the trial 
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court, in its Order dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint, stated 
only that "Plaintiff is precluded from maintaining its action by 
the provisions of the Utah Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code 
Ann., Sections 58-50-1, et seq." Record at 139 and 140. It should 
be noted that the Defendant is the one that prepared the Order for 
the trial court's signature. 
There is no other explanation given for the court's decision 
to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint and there was no record made 
of the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment. There were no 
findings of fact made by the trial court nor any conclusions of law 
made, other than the one which was specifically stated in the 
Order. Furthermore, the Defendant drafted the Order that the court 
below signed. 
Given these circumstances, it is improper now for the 
Defendant to claim that the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff's 
Complaint on any other grounds than that which is stated in the 
Order. Apparently, the Defendant would have this Court sit as the 
trial court to reach issues which were not presented and argued to, 
or decided by, the court below. 
a. The Trial Court Could Not Have Based Its Dismissal Of 
Plaintiff's Complaint Upon Any Alleged Failure To Comply With 
Contractual Notice Requirements. 
The trial court did not rule that the Plaintiff failed to 
comply with any contractual conditions precedent to making the 
claims asserted by the Plaintiff. It was not even an issue with 
the trial court. Further, this issue is fraught with disputed 
factual questions which would preclude resolution of this issue on 
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motion for summai Im M.'wiiiip I »•* while it is disputed by 
the Plaintiff, the Defendant alleges that the Plajn 
qlve notice required under the contract, Yet the Defendant, in 
its own aflnlivil, ,iJ " j " 'ial ii mpqotiated with the Plaintiff 
regarding the claim of ti-.e PLaintiff for several years pi:lor tu M'H' 
f,.\ -, * th:s action,, Recoid at; 99, Further, in the Plaintiff's 
affidavi"' .„ thcil, I h « l>«f^ nd.ml. neqotiated with the 
Plaintiff and was provided with documentation ot tine claim since 
during the performance ni ti «-* .* t** 
Did L .*• ntractual requirements? 
Did Defendants negotiation with the Plaintiff concerning fhe rl.iiii' 
for several years prior to the commencement of this action 
constitute a A <* contract? 
These questions present disputed issues ol i act 'which cannot be 
resolved on motion for summary judgment and therefore, coul d not 
ha ve served as • dismiss 
the Plaintiff f s Complaint. Or in the <*. ternati^ •= i«? i ssue 
il'ii -3 as tl" le basis tor th<:» trial court's decisions,, it was 
improper since there wei e Ji ».»|_ni I cd is-stie:. ul Mint nr la 1 fact relating 
thereto. 
b. The Trial court Could Not Have Based Its Dismissal Of 
Plaintiff's Complaint Upon Any Alleged Failure To Allege That 
It Was Licensed. 
! -• "".e trial court rule that the Plaintiff's Jomplaint 
s!" - lismissed due to a failure 1 o allege that Mackay was 
licensed. This too w<i . • " M,r hn*'1 : d± court's 
decision, If it had been, an^ dismissal - : ..i-i.j : : om any such 
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alleged failure would have been without prejudice rather than with 
prejudice as is the case with the court's Order. Additionally, in 
the case of Olsen v. Reese, 200 P.2d 733 (Utah 1948), this court 
ruled that the trial court must give the claimant an opportunity 
to amend his pleadings to correct any alleged failure in pleading 
that he was properly licensed prior to a dismissal of the claim on 
that basis. Plaintiff was not given this opportunity as required. 
Further, since the action brought by the Plaintiff was an 
action to enforce the arbitration clauses of the subcontracts, the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 do not apply. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff should not required to allege and prove 
that it was licensed since that Section only bars actions to 
recover compensation. 
In Olsen, supra, the Court restated the general common law 
rule that an unlicensed contractor may be barred from recovery but 
remanded the case to allow the claimant to amend his pleadings to 
reflect that he was properly licensed. Since 1948, the Utah courts 
have adopted notice pleading. It is questionable whether an 
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the plaintiff is 
properly licensed is required since by making the claim, the 
plaintiff must at some point in time make the allegation and proof, 
such as in the case of motions for summary judgment as in the 
present case. This makes good sense in light of the fact that even 
if a person is not technically proper in his contractor's license, 
he may still be allowed recovery by application of the equitable 
exceptions to the general rule against recovery. 
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Thus, «:> il i siiiissa I based u< '•» <• ->"i i POACI failure to al lege 
that the Plaintiff was licensed w jUxd aiov. ua.e oeen improper si i i< : K 5 
determination of that Issue involves numerous issues of material 
fact regard. - -. - stances of the '""HM-,1 
warrant the application t .0 * ;w. \.a . •- common law excep 
the qeneral rule against recovery :>y ^licensed contracto: 
For >..•• - •< :l ."! as stated 
in trie Defendant's statement t u*^ Issues .-. Appeal, Page I. ol 
Defendant's ^ri^f v ' ht- statement ! - grounds for the trial 
cour^-' . jisii!.^ >* 1 II .and ( -?: ) in 
the Summary r ? hu Argument contained ii • n Defendant's Brlel at; 
Page 13 and subsequently discussed in the Argument commencing at 
Page I,'" , a • 0 1 pi oper 1 'v before M » M . Court and should be 
disregarded. 
II. THE EQUITABLE COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE 
GENERAL RULE AGAINST RECOVERY DO APPLY TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 58-50-11 AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION AND AS STATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
The Defendant and the trial court rely on statutory 1 anguage, 
codif led i 11 »; a 1 11 H ne M T I 11 HI IM \ 11 I I u 111 11II1 • - * • - * 1 s. 
Previous to the enactment ot the statute^ oinu,.:, pi^i^.ples 
existed in Utah's common law which applied * -ill rofessions or 
occupations wh i«•'»> » ' >»' .v l a L e 1 ei • . There is a 
long line oh Utah Supreme Court authority ...iterpret. ng the common 
law and the 'various statutes, which cases deal primarily with 
contractor licensing. 
The Supreme Court has treated the common law rule and the 
9 
statutes the same. The many cases indicate that the Supreme Court 
has always realized the harshness of declaring unenforceable the 
contracts of persons who may not be properly licensed. "This court 
has not applied the general rule of denying relief to unlicensed 
persons inflexibly or too broadly." Fillmore Products, Inc. v. 
Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977). In Fillmore, 
the Utah court stated: 
It is inequitable and unjust to rule as a 
matter of law or summary judgment that the 
defendant can take the benefit of plaintifffs 
labor and refuse to pay for it. . . . The 
general rule will no doubt continue to be 
maintained as the general rule, while still 
permitting the court to consider the merits of 
the particular case to avoid unreasonable 
penalties and forfeitures. 
The purpose of the contractor licensing statute is to protect 
the public from inept, unqualified or irresponsible contractors. 
Fillmore, supra, at 689. See also, Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 
805 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein. The Supreme Court has 
never applied the common law rule or these statutes to deny 
recovery to an unlicensed contractor against: (1) a defendant who 
was not intended by the legislature to be protected by the 
licensing law, or (2) a defendant who has actual protection from 
inept, unqualified or irresponsible contractors apart from the 
licensing law. Such a denial of recovery would cause an unreason-
able penalty and forfeiture. 
The common law rule and the statutes denying recovery should 
not be applied when the party from whom plaintiff seeks to recover 
is not a member of the class the legislature intended to protect 
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I • i itended 
licensing law statutes has been ^utordea \, • s. 
L igne11, sugra, at 80H. 
This Coiii'i" 11. ia, in <L xncit • .' : ; censina l-«w •-
intended for protecting the public should 
unwarranted shield for the avoidance at - -u:-,- (Obligation. 
Fillmore, supra, a t: 690 'j-. r~nt - .suuu, UI-LS ^C-. * 
has developed many exceptions to the general rule against recovery, 
aintiff technically had 
structure 
though * *.. - icense did 
c- * orporat: .:. , ma ny o f 
Plaintiff 
Even if the license maintained * • 
not been conver ted tc i: ef 1 < 
and organization (see Record it M< l 
reflect substantially the -MJIH' jamp **:. 
these equitable coiiini" n Liu cxvc- -. 
to maintain this action to compel • i,<. Defendan -j^oitrate. 
The common 1 aw exception - c a 11.ow r ecovery t•-; i -.. .:: Licensed 
contractor i eijcudLebii ul win,11 I ' - ;- :*e common 
law rule or the statutes codifying Kinkella v. Baugh, i>faU I'.J.d 
233 (Utah 1983 Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 
P ,.'.•! V'bfj I III ' ac: * L 
The case of Wilderness Building Systems makes it clear that 
the common law exceptions apply to the statute relied upon by the 
Defendant and the trial court. While the Wilderness Court held 
that the exceptions did not apply on the particular facts, it 
applied the claimed exceptions to the facts of that case and 
affirmed that the exceptions established in Lignell, supra 
(defendants were protected by their own knowledge and expertise), 
and Motivated Management, supra (unlicensed contractor working 
under the supervision of a licensed contractor), are still relevant 
considerations in light of Utah's codification of the common law 
principles. See also, Pacific Chromalox Division v. Irey, 128 
Ut.Adv. Rep. 8 (Ut. App. February 12, 1990) (unlicensed engineer 
allowed recovery despite statute substantially similar to Utah Code 
In the case of Lignell v. Berg, supra, the contractor's 
unlicensed status did not preclude recovery against the owner• 
This Court held that the defendant could not rely on Plaintiff's 
unlicensed status. The defendant was not a member of the class 
intended to be protected by the licensing law. In that case, the 
plaintiff's license had inadvertently lapsed. Defendant had 
contracted with the plaintiff as a general contractor on previous 
occasions and therefore was relying on previous experience with the 
plaintiff and not on any possible competence inferred by the 
plaintiff's licensed status. Further, the plaintiff had recently 
proven its technical competence and responsibility by obtaining a 
contractors license. Plaintiff could have renewed its license by 
paying a fee and filling out applications for renewal without 
additional testing. 
The present case presents an even more compelling case for 
application of this equitable common law exception. The Plaintiff 
maintained a contractors license at the time the contracts were 
entered with the Defendant and all during the course of the 
project. Although the name on the license was not identical to the 
corporate name, it was substantially similar. And, more important-
ly, each time the license came up for renewal, the Plaintiff 
exhibited all of the technical competence and financial 
Annotated Section 58-55-11 on the basis that the company defending 
against the unlicensed engineer's claims was adequately protected 
by its own expertise). The Pacific Chromalox case is discussed in 
further detail, infra. 
12 
responsibi I 11 , " ha ,/w l| IMJ iji'Miife renewed, At ibe t i me fi"»e 
inadvertent technical deficiency was discovered, the Plainti I 1 
simply paid * i-- * n,-w-> n v .icense renewed. 
, . . - . - j rjLcu-iitxi ^  !^ar v;*]3fuliy 
disregarded the licensing i .^ ^ e> .. crier cases .:*-• • i 
Coui H i~i whc-r^ the c * aimants therein ,<e; ?.. t allowed ~- ecover. 
The - --• * - * license -ijnrid 
faith, although arguably with technical defects, rur more ilian I i /c 
years. 
Furthermoi e I I it" De feuijan t and I he I"11 a i n I i f f have contracted 
with each other for many years during which Lime the Plaintili hen: 
proven its technical competence and responsibility. The Defendant 
herein did Plaint ,f iui 
on its own experience ' > • .\ ••- rlaintiti a.io . r
 r »wn expertise. 
The defense raised by the Defendant is nothing more than a naked 
effori * avoid I uhl 
In * - f Motivated Management International v. Finney, 
i " 4o/ v:^v'u, 1 9r"/9|(1 the trie* •; * • deniec motion to 
dismiss the complaint in «i pn> I lie 
plaintiff had worked under the supervisor i a .Lcensed prime 
con tractor and the defendant was thereby afforded protection of the 
licensing statut t.f s work 
was performed under M:* supervision . -efendant, , properly 
licensed general contractor. Defendant > i sophisticated general 
contractor knowl edge ab 1 e i I tl le * The 
Defendant's owi I knowledge and expertise pi jvided iio pi ^te- :*->n, 
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not the licensing laws. See also, Pacific Chromalox Division v. 
Irey, 128 Ut.Adv.Rep. 8 (Ct. App. February 12, 1990). The 
Defendant herein is simply not a member of the class intended to 
be protected under the licensing laws. 
In the case of Kinkella v. Baugh, supra, the unlicensed prime 
contractor was allowed to recover the contract price for his 
services because the plaintiff's son was a licensed contractor and 
supervised the project. The court stated that the defendant was 
afforded protection of licensed contractor status. Even more 
compellingly in the present case, all of Plaintiff's work was 
supervised by the Defendant as well as by the engineers employed 
by the project owner, UDOT. Furthermore, the Defendant, in order 
to give UDOT the impression that the Plaintiff was not a 
subcontractor, carried various personnel of the Plaintiff on the 
Defendant's payroll. Record at 112. 
In Loader v. Scott Construction Corporation, 681 P.2d 1227 
(Utah 1984), a licensed contractor defendant raised the same 
statutory defense alleged by the Defendant herein. This Court 
refused to allow the plaintiff's unlicensed status as a bar to 
recovery. The Court held that a defendant who is a licensed 
contractor does not belong to the class of persons the general rule 
of non-recovery by an unlicensed contractor was intended to 
protect. The Court stated that a licensed contractor is deemed to 
possess the expertise himself. 
The licensed contractor consequently cannot 
invoke application of the general rule denying 
relief to an unlicensed contractor solely 
because of the latter's non-licensing when the 
14 
contract for construction is struck between 
them. As a licensed contractor, Scott [the 
defendant] is presumed to possess expertise in 
the contracting business. Scott therefore is 
not in need of the protection the licensing 
statute was i ntended to provide the 1 ay 
public. 
Loader at 1229. The Loader case has further similarities to the 
case at bar. The plaintifffs unlicensed status in Loader was the 
resu It of a good I; a 11 h be 1 i <j I I 11.11 IK I IOI I I d - . > f o r m e r 
p a r t n e r f s license. Even more compellingly, Tne Fldinu fi );erein 
performed the contract i^ *^*w ^ood faith ,exiei iha* it was 
properly licensed. 
Also, In Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, 
supra, this Coui+ K*~ ,s 4t ** inem^Mi contractor -iiu- * i \« Kt 
the fal > • 
the direct supervision cf -i licensed project engineer and . < 
was checked for compliance with the contract before payment to 
piaint iff. Her e J I I 111 • I'" I .HI I I i i I"' * . i 
Fillmore, The Plaintiff's work was overseen by .:^\ 
Defendant but also the UDOT's own engineers who verified the work 
and the necessary qu^ ' 
a. The Rules of Statutory Construction Dictate That The Equitable 
Common Law Exceptions To The General Rule Against Recovery 
Apply To Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. 
The Defendant wouJ d erroneously ?- <^  4",f *• ^ «> bt»Ji^ve 
that the common law exceptions to the general : . e against recovery 
1)Y «HI unlicensed contractor have been abolished >- modification 
of I he general rule. The general i. uh» - ' y l4ie 
Utah legislature and has, through several re-enactments, appeared 
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at one time as Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. 
The Defendant goes to great lengths to cite the Court to cases 
which hold that when a legislature substantively amends a statute, 
there is a presumption that the legislature intended to change the 
existing law. However, the Defendant ignores the fact that these 
cases are easily distinguishable from and do not apply to the 
present case. Since the cases cited by the Defendant deal with the 
amendment of existing statutes, they are of no benefit in deciding 
the present case. Rather, the present case involves the codifica-
tion of a long-standing common law rule. 
Where a legislature merely codifies existing common law, the 
rule is that absent an express intention to overrule the existing 
common law, new legislation will be presumed to be in line with 
prior judicial decisions. Thus, since the Utah legislature merely 
codified the existing common law general rule against recovery by 
an unlicensed contractor and did not express any intention 
whatsoever to abolish the equitable exceptions, the prior-existing 
common law exceptions to the general rule apply to the new 
legislation. 
The Defendant would have this Court hold that by enacting Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-50-11, the legislature intended that the 
common law rule be changed. However, such is not the law of 
statutory interpretation. The Defendant has cited this Court to 
many cases which at first glance may seem to stand for the 
proposition which it would have this Court apply to the case at bar 
to prevent the application of the common law exceptions to the 
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general rule agaii is f: recovery , llowevoi , i ™i >< m i < • J user examination, 
none of these cases are on point and do nothing to aid the t'ouit 
determining whether the common law exceptions apply under Utah 
Code Annotated Sectioi 1 58-50 11. 
The question is whether or not there is a presumption that the 
]{jiif,j held common 1 aw applies to » statute There are at least two 
different situations where t: - ; fi i 
the legislature amends an existing statute, and second, where the 
legi slati :ii: e enacts an or igina 1 statut -
The several cases the Det t ,H, ' sl~ i »t«f :•• tM t i /» •• 
es which have been amended. Thus, in ciJ-uations where the legisla-
tur e substantively amends an existing statute, the correct presump-
tion I is that the legislature * • T " t he 
extent that the Defendant intends the cases cited to stanu for this 
pi: oposi tion, it ' * at^r * a ! z * 
However, such 
i.e , where th<~ legislateiv enacts in original statute, The 
present case inv- * •• - originally enacted statute and, 
therefore, the ro _<_ i dai I t: ha' P HI » app i ioation ! o 
the present case. 
The rule ^f statutory interpretation which is applicable to 
originally er,». * »- N-HH" present- r,.»isel(l 
is that where the legislature merely codifies an existing common 
law ruie* resumption that ••. legislature di'l not 
intend to change the commo .: ihu,. iiisf 111 an 
express intention otherwise. Hie enactment of a .statute winch 
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simply codifies an existing common law rule does not effect a 
change in the law. 
This principal of statutory construction has been applied by 
the Utah Court of Appeals. In the case of Pacific Chromalox 
Division v. Irey, 128 Ut.Adv. Rep. 8 (Ut.App. February 12, 1990), 
the Court of Appeals dealt with the question of whether an 
unlicensed engineer could recover for services rendered despite a 
statute substantially similar to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-
50-11. The Court of Appeals, in interpreting the codified general 
rule against recovery by an unlicensed engineer, stated "Because 
section 58-22-20 only states explicitly what the general rule has 
been held to be, we interpret the statute consistently with the 
r^se law which has developed under the general rule." Therefore, 
' •* is subject to the same interpretations and application 
^ die common law rule had been. Since there was no Utah case law 
which dealt with recovery of compensation by an unlicensed 
engineer, the Utah Court of Appeals in the Pacific Chromalox case 
applied the common law exceptions developed in the contractor 
licensing setting to the facts of that case. The cases used by the 
Utah Court of Appeals to allow recovery by the unlicensed engineer 
are part of the cases relied upon by the Plaintiff. 
The Pacific Chromalox case is not the only Utah case to follow 
the rule that where a statute is enacted to simply restate the 
common law rule, the presumption is that the legislature did not 
intend a change in the common law rule. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has also taken this position in the case of Home v. Home, 737 
18 
P. 2d 244 (Ut.App. 1987). In that case, the Court of Appeals stated 
"Statutes are not to be construed as effecting a change in the 
common law beyond that which is clearly indicated." Id. at 248. 
There are many other jurisdictions which follow the rule of 
statutory construction that where the a statute is enacted as 
simply a restatement of the common law rule, the statute is subject 
to the same interpretation and application as the common law rule. 
A sample of these cases is as follows: Marana Unified School 
District No. 6 v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 Ariz. 159, 690 
P.2d 711 (Ariz.App. 1984) (unless legislature clearly indicates 
intention to do so, its enactments shall not be construed to change 
established common law); People v. Cardenas, 31 Cal.3d 897, 184 
Cal.Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569 (1982) (legislative enactments should 
not be construed to overthrow long established principles of law 
unless such intention is made clear to appear by express 
declaration); Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pacific 
Insurance Co., Ltd., 768 P.2d 266 (Hawaii 1989) (legislature's 
enacting into statute common law concept is clue that courts are 
to interpret and apply statute with freedom with which they would 
construe and apply common law principle); State v. Jones, 242 Kan. 
385, 748 P.2d 839 (1988) (when an act is prohibited and made 
punishable by statute, the statute is to be construed in light of 
common law); State v. Bushnell, 38 Wash.App. 809, 690 P.2d 601 
(1984) (In the absence of an indication from the legislature to 
overrule the common law, new legislation will be presumed 
consistent with prior judicial decisions); and State v. Stovall, 
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648 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1982) (A statute designed to change common law 
must be strictly construed; it must speak in clear and unequivocal 
terms, for presumption is that no change is intended in common law 
unless the statute is explicit). 
Thus, under the rules of statutory construction, this Court 
must apply the equitable common law exceptions to the general rule 
against recovery since Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 (and 
its predecessor and successor statutes) merely restates what the 
common law general rule has been. 
b. The Decisions By The Utah Supreme Court And The Utah Court of 
Appeals Hold That The Equitable Common Law Exceptions To The 
General Rule Against Recovery Apply To Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-50-11. 
The Defendant goes to great lengths to cite this Court to 
cases decided in other jurisdictions relating to the application 
of the equitable common law exceptions to the rule against recovery 
by an unlicensed contractor while completely ignoring or minimizing 
the importance of cases decided by this Court and the Utah Court 
of Appeals. These other jurisdictions do not have the same long-
standing common law exceptions to the general rule against recovery 
by an unlicensed contractor as does Utah. These other jurisdic-
tions also do not have the same public policy as Utah which has 
been reinforced again and again by this Court (i.e., that the 
general rule against recovery should not be applied mechanically 
and should not be used to cause unreasonable and unnecessary for-
feitures) . 
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Further, as support for its position, Plaintiff has cited to 
the Court to the Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), case in which this Court did apply the common 
law exceptions to a case decided under the codified general rule. 
While the Defendant attempts to downplay the importance of the 
Wilderness case, the Defendant's assertion that since the facts of 
the Wilderness case did not warrant the exercise of the common law 
exceptions they do not apply in the present case is misplaced. 
Defendant's assertions does not change the simple fact that this 
Court did apply the equitable exceptions to the facts of that case. 
Additionally, since the time the Plaintiff filed its initial 
brief, the Utah Court of Appeals has applied the equitable excep-
tions decided in the context of contractor licensing to a statutory 
provision prohibiting an unlicensed engineer from recovering. In 
the case of Pacific Chromalox Division v. Irey, 128 Ut.Adv.Rep. 8 
(Ct.App. February 12, 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a 
decision by the Second District Court for Weber County and held 
that the person acting as an unlicensed engineer could recover 
compensation despite the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
58-22-20 (1953 as enacted in 1955). That Section provides in 
pertinent part: 
[n]o person shall bring or maintain an action 
in the courts of this state for enforcement of 
any contract or the recovery of any sums due 
in connection with the practice of engineering 
or land surveying in this state as defined 
herein, without alleging and proving that he 
was duly authorized to practice under the 
provisions of this act . . . . 
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This Section is substantially the same as the statute involved 
in the present case, Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. That 
Section states: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or 
maintain any action in any court of the state 
for collection of compensation for the per-
formance of any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, citing George v. Oren Limited & 
Associates, 672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983) as a statement of the common 
law general rule, stated: 
[i]f the purpose of licensing is to protect 
the public, then the general rule in this 
State is that the party who does not obtain a 
license, but is required to do so, cannot 
obtain relief to enforce the terms of his 
contract -- including payment thereunder --
even though there are other penalties imposed 
against him expressly by statute including 
criminal sanctions. 
Chromalox at 12. This common law general rule applies to all 
licensed professions and occupations, including engineers and 
contractors. 
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that "Because section 58-22-
20 only states explicitly what the what the general rule has been 
held to be [under the common law], we interpret the statute 
consistently with the case law which has developed under the 
general rule." It should be noted that the statute in the 
Chromalox case, dealing with engineers, was enacted many years 
before the development of many of the common law exceptions to the 
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general rule in the context of the contractor licensing and many 
years before the codification of the general rule in the contractor 
licensing statutes. 
Since the area of recovery of compensation by an unlicensed 
engineer is devoid of Utah case law, the Court of Appeals applied 
the common law exceptions, as developed in the context of 
contractor licensing, to the general rule as codified at Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-22-20. 
Based upon the application of the equitable exceptions, the 
Court of Appeals held that the unlicensed engineer could recover 
on his contract because Pacific Chromalox was not a member of the 
class intended to be protected by the engineering licensing laws 
and because whatever protection would have been provided by the 
licensing laws was provided by other means, including Pacific 
Chromaloxfs own expertise in the area of engineering. This holding 
is consistent with the cases upon which the Plaintiff relies 
herein. 
It should be noted that the Pacific Chromalox case was decided 
by the Utah Court of Appeals approximately one month prior to the 
filing of the Defendant's Brief. And while it may be under-
standable how the Defendant missed this important case before 
filing its Brief herein, it is unfortunate that the Defendant 
failed to address that case in its Brief to the Court. In any 
case, while the Pacific Chromalox case was decided by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, it is a persuasive and well reasoned approach to 
the application of the equitable exceptions to the general rule 
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against recovery. The decision in the Pacific Chromalox case 
follows the long-standing application of those exceptions by this 
Court to payment disputes involving licensed professions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There was only one ground upon which the trial court dismissed 
the Plaintiff's Complaint. The trial court stated "Plaintiff is 
precluded from maintaining its action by the provisions of the Utah 
Contractor Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 58-50-1." 
Plaintiff need not allege or prove that it was properly licensed 
since this is an action to compel arbitration, not an action for 
compensation as is specifically stated in the statute. Section 58-
50-11 should be strictly construed. 
Furthermore, under both pre-existing common law and present 
Utah law, it was error for the lower court to dismiss the 
Plaintiff's Complaint since the equitable common law exceptions to 
the general rule against recovery apply to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-50-11. This result is dictated by statutory rules of 
construction and the decisions by the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Even if the Plaintiff's license did not substantially comply 
with the contractor licensing law, several of the exceptions to the 
codified rule against recovery apply to the present case. The 
Defendant was adequately protected by the supervision by its own 
personnel as well as by the engineering personnel of UDOT. 
Further, general contractors like the Defendant are not intended 
to have the protection of the contractor licensing law. Their 
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expertise removes them from the class of protected persons. To 
allow the Defendant to invoke the rule against recovery as a 
defense would work the unjust penalty and forfeiture that the 
legislature did not intend and the judicial system cannot allow. 
Plaintiff now respectfully requests that this court, based on 
the authorities and arguments cited herein and those in the 
Plaintiff's initial Brief, reverse the trial court's judgment of 
dismissal and remand the case for trial on the merits. 
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I and the other elements attendant on 
obtaining a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence are 
present. If there be evidence before 
the court upon which reasonable 
(persons) might differ as to whether 
or not the defendant is guilty,, the 
trial court may deny a motion for a 
new trial. 
The evidence defendant sought to introduce 
in support of his motion for a new trial was 
not in fact newly discovered evidence.* Rather, 
it was cumulative, irrelevant, or inadmissible.* 
It was therefore insufficient to support hit 
motion.4 
because it will have to counter defendant's 
theory with proof that an alternative theory 
(namely, that the described abuse actually 
occurred in all of the cases) explains the coi-
ncidence. It also claims that some of the inf-
ormation it would be required to use in that 
effort is "privileged." We know of no princ-
iple of law limiting a defendant's exploration 
of facts in his defense because the State 
refuses or is unable to adduce other facts in 
rebuttal. 
Defendant has been convicted of seven fel-
onies involving crimes of the most terrible and 
reprehensible nature. It is essential that those 
convictions be supported by an unimpeachably 
fair and even-handed process. Defendant's 
allegations about new evidence relating to the 
credibility of Barbara Snow and the children 
on his motion for a new trial were adequate to 
create the need for an evidentiary hearing and 
the creation of a record upon which this Court 
could review the ruling on that motion. We 
therefore vacate the trial court's denial of the 
motion for a new trial and remand this case 
for an evidentiary hearing on that motion, 
including of course the question of whether 
defendant's proffered evidence may properly 
be regarded as newly discovered. Defendant, 
of course, will be required to comply with the 
Utah Rules of Evidence in his offers of evid-
ence. Because of the continuing pendency of 
that motion in light of this holding, we do not 
address further any of defendant's challenges 
to the underlying convictions. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Richard C. Davidson, Court of Appeals 
Judge 
1. We note, however, thai when asked at trial 
whether the bad written a doctoral thesis. Dr. Snow 
responded by saying that she had written a 
"master's diesis" (on a different topic) and did not 
mention the cuay In question. We cannot tell ttom 
the record whether there was simply a misundersta-
nding between defense counsel and Dr. Snow or 
whether she intended that he not become aware of 
the subject of her doctoral research. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent because 1 am not persuaded that 
the Court abused its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial. As was 
observed in State v. Hams,1 
The denial of (a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence) will be deemed 
an abuse of discretion only in such 
instances where there is a grave 
suspicion that justice may have been 
miscarried because of the lack of 
enlightenment on a vital point, 
which the new evidence will supply; 
UTAH 
Zimmerman, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hall. 
Stewart, Justice, does not participate 
herein; Davidson, Court of Appeals Judge, 
sat. 
1. 30 Utah 2d 77. 80. 513 P.2d 438, 439-10 (Utah 
1973). 
2. State v. WUluuns, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1983). 
J. State v. GdUUy, 22 Utah 2d 149. 449 P.2d 993 
(Utah 1969). 
4. See supra note I. 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant Pacific Chromalox Division, 
Emerson Electric Co. (Chromalox) brought an 
NCE REPORTS 
coo*.co Pacific Cbromalo: 
frg&um lil i l i ihj 
action against respondents Richard F. Ircy 
(Irey) and Industrial Engineering and Manuf- I 
acturtng Corp. (I.E.M.) for breach of contract 
and breach of warranty. Respondents count-
erclaimed for breach of contract and unjust ' 
enrichment. After a jury trial, the jury ruled 
in favor of respondents. We affirm. 
Chromalox, a subsidiary of Emerson Elec-
tric, is a manufacturer of industrial heating 
elements which it sells to companies that 
produce heating equipment for commercial 
Applications. It docs not sell heating elements 
to residential customers. Irey, as the president 
and owner of l.E.M., designs and builds one-
of-a-kind automated machines. I.E.M.'s 
staff includes Irey's wife, some machinists and 
assembly people, and some consulting engin-
eers, including Joseph W. Lindsey. 
During the summer of 1982, Chromalox's 
manager of manufacturing engineering, Ned 
Blackett, in response to corporate cost-
cutting targets, was interested in reducing the 
cost of Chromalox's complicated, labor inte-
nsive process for producing heating coils. He 
did not know if it was possible to build a 
machine to automate this process, but was 
interested in the possible savings that might 
result if such a machine could be built. He 
first-offered this 'high risk* project to another 
company, which declined it. Blackett then 
heard about Irey's work in automation engi-
neering and offered the project to him. 
- Irey visited the Chromalox facility, located 
in Ogden, Utah, and observed the coil prod-
uction process. On about August 10, 1982, he 
hand-carried a proposal for the machine to 
Chromalox and met with Blackett. He told 
Blackett that he could build a machine to 
duplicate the process exactly. Blackett told 
Irey that he could not pay more than $75,000 
for the machine because of corporate financial 
restrictions, but if the machine worked, Chr-
omalox might be interested in a second 
machine for another plant, and that Chrom-
alox had need of other types of automated 
machinery which Irey might be able to build. 
On November 2, 1982, I.E.M., through 
Irey, agreed to manufacture the machine for 
Chromalox for $69,896 plus tax, with delivery 
to take place in fourteen to sixteen weeks. Irey 
arrived at this price by subtracting the requi-
site amount of sales tax from Chromalox's 
$75,000 ceiling. He deliberately underbid the 
project, which he figured would cost about 
1120,000 to complete, because he felt, on the 
basis of Blackett's representations that a 
second machine might be needed and that 
Chromalox was interested m additional auto-
mated machinery, that it was an investment in 
his future business. To meet the price ceiling, 
Irey and Blackett agreed to eliminate a washer 
orienter called for in the original specificat-
ions. 
Blackett filed a purchase requisition for the 
machine on November 9, 1982. Specifications 
Division v. Irey
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set forth in the purchase order included the 
following: The machine was to be capable of 
applying a stud on both ends of a heating coil, 
which could range in diameter from 06* to 
.115", at a minimum rate of 600 coils per 
hour. It was to accept coils made from twenty 
to thirty-two gauge wire, was to be designed 
and constructed for continuous service, and 
was to allow for convenient servicing and 
repairs. The purchase order specified a deli-
very date of February I, 1983. I.E.M. was to 
test the machine at its facility prior to deli-
very. Chromalox was to pay I.E.M. fifty 
percent of the contract amount upon satisfa-
ctory completion of the machine, with the 
remainder due within thirty days. 
I.E.M. did not begin production of the 
machine until after December 7, 1982, when 
Chromalox sent required documentation reg-
arding some of the specifications. About this 
time, Blackett became aware that the previo-
usly eliminated washer orienting device might 
be necessary to duplicate the manufacturing 
process. He discussed the problem with Irey, 
who told him that it would not be any 
problem to put a little orienter mechanism on 
the machine. They did not discuss any price 
increase or extension of the delivery date for 
the machine. 
On March 31, 1983, approximately sixteen 
weeks later, Irey delivered the uncompleted 
machine to Chromalox's facility at Blackett's 
request, because Blackett needed to demonst-
rate It to "corporate people" from Emerson 
Electric. Irey indicated that it would take two 
to three weeks to complete the machine, but 
that it was to the point that he could complete 
it at Chromalox's plant. Because of its unco-
mpleted condition, Chromalox did not pay for 
the machine at this time. 
However, by April 1983, the machine was 
still not producing heating coil assemblies, and 
had numerous problems. First, the parties 
finally determined that addition of the washer 
orienter was necessary. Second, the washer 
dispenser on the machine continually jammed. 
Although Chromalox suggests that this 
problem was the result of Irey's poor design, 
Irey indicated that the washers supplied by 
Chromalox may have caused much of the 
problem: He stated that it is understood in the 
automation industry that you will get washers 
free from burrs, deformations, and dirt 
because an automated machine cannot handle 
nonidentical parts. Even though Chromalox's 
specifications stated that the washers used for 
production by the machine would be flat and 
free from burrs, they were not. Instead, they 
were nonidentical in shape and were mixed 
with bits of rock left from Chromalox's deb-
urring operation. Consequently, Irey mainta-
ined that the problems encountered with the 
washer dispenser were a result of the poor 
quality of the washers. Finally, Irey and 
i Chromalox engineers determined that it would 
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be necessary to add a previously uncontempl-
ated coil centering device to the machine. In 
its initial specification!. Chromalox had repr-
esented that the coils used on the machine 
would be manufactured to within plus or 
minus one coil diameter in length. However, 
the coils provided by Chromalox did not 
conform to this standard. According to Irey, 
the coil centering device was a necessary 
modification to compensate for Chromalox's 
lack of quality control, but interfered with the 
operation of the rest of the machine. 
During the ensuing year, Irey continued to 
work part time, together with Chromalox 
engineers, on the machine at the Chromalox 
plant. He spent a considerable amount of time 
on two unsuccessful attempts to design and 
install the washer orienter while Chromalox 
engineers constantly changed the specifications 
for the machine. 
Although the machine was not operational 
during this period, never producing more than 
ten or twelve coil assemblies at a time, Chro-
malox paid Irey the total contract amount for 
the machine by October 4, 1983 because Irey 
was facing extreme financial pressures. Blac-
ken told Irey that if the machine worked, 
Chromalox would be willing to pay I.E.M. an 
additional $30,000 for the design and engine-
ering package as an attempt to compensate 
him for the additional engineering work. 
On March 26, 1984, Blackett authorized the 
machine's return to I.E.M.*s facility in Salt 
Lake City for the purpose of refining the 
washer feeder and finding a way to orient the 
washers. During the ensuing ninety days, Irey 
again redesigned the washer orienter. 
However, the machine developed additional 
problems related to the washer feeder and 
washer orienter. 
Irey returned the machine to Chromalox in 
June 1984, representing that it would produce 
about 250 pans per hour and that Chromalox 
could start training an operator. However, the 
machine continually jammed after producing 
only a few parts. Nevertheless, Chromalox 
trained two operators. One of them, Carolyn 
Cromwell, stated that she operated the 
machine on and off for about two months, 
that the machine only produced twenty-five 
coils per hour and seven coils in one sequence, 
and that it was always jamming and was under 
repair more than it was operational. 
In October 1984, the parties decided to 
further modify the machine by adding another 
operation, cutting off the 'pigtail* hook on 
the heating coils, which required the 
machine's return to I.E.M.'s facility. Blackett 
told Irey that he did not care what Irey did to 
the machine but that it had to produce 400 
parts per hour to be acceptable, and claimed 
that this request was simply for a modification 
of Irey's design, not a modification of the 
original specification. 
The transfer order authorizing the 
machine's return to I.E.M., dated November 
1. 1984. indicated that there was to be no 
charge for this work. Irey, however, testified 
that he had not seen or agreed to this order 
prior to the trial. On November 5, 1984, 
Chromalox shipped the machine to LE.M.'s 
facility by common carrier. Because of Chro-
malox's admitted negligence, the machine was 
damaged during shipping. Robert Slater, a 
senior Chromalox engineer, went to I.E.M.*s 
facility, verified the damage, and authorized 
Irey to repair the damage and bill Chromalox 
for the $1,500 repair cost. Chromalox never 
paid for this repair, although Blackett alleges 
that he deducted it from expenses which 
Chromalox had incurred on Irey's behalf. 
Because Irey understood, from Blackett's 
comments, that he was to *go ahead* with the 
machine, he designed, extensively tested, and 
debugged a fourth washer orienter and insta-
lled it on the machine. Having done this, he 
videotaped the machine operating at the rate 
of 500 coil assemblies per hour, and with the 
assistance of his consulting engineer, ran 
timing tests which came out at 7.14 seconds 
per cycle, a rate of about 505 parts per hour. . • 
In March or April 1985, Irey arranged for 
Chromalox representatives to come to the 
I.E.M. facility for a demonstration of the 
machine. Irey requested that they bring new 
coils for the demonstration because the old 
coils were bent and damaged from repeated 
testing. Chromalox representatives, however, 
forgot to bring the new coils, so Irey was 
forced to use the old, damaged ones for the 
demonstration. Consequently, the machine 
malfunctioned during the demonstration. 
However, one Chromalox representative. 
Slater, indicated that he watched the machine, 
which had undergone considerable changes, 
operate through its cycle for about ten minutes 
with the reclaimed coils, and stated that it 
'looked excellent.* He observed that the 
machine could be run at 400 pans per hour, 
but was unable to run 400 parts because Irey 
had insufficient coils to do so. He also testi-
fied that the additional parts put on the 
machine at Chromalox's request slowed It 
down, and that he was expecting to pay app-
roximately $10,000 for the modifications to 
the machine. Blackett, however, stated that 
the machine would only cycle at a rate of 287 
pans per hour and would break down after 
several minutes of operation. 
Irey asserts that the changes and modifica-
tions Chromalox requested after March 31, 
1983 required additional engineering and 
materials valued at $185,817. He states that 
this amount represents nothing but modifica-
tions, and be had subtracted out expenses for 
which he felt responsible. After the demonst-
ration. Irey was willing to settle with Blackett 
for $52,000 for these changes, and demanded 
payment. In response, Blackett told Irey that 
Chromalox would not pay any more for the 
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machine, that Chromalox owned it, and that 
Chromalox representatives would come and 
pick it up. He testified that Irey never billed 
him for the alleged modifications and that the 
only modification he requested was the washer 
centering device. He further alleged that 
Chromalox never accepted the machine as 
completed because it never functioned accor-
ding to the specifications; that Chromalox had 
provided Irey with sufficient coils, washers, 
and bolts to complete and demonstrate the 
machine; and that Chromalox had paid Irey in 
full for the machine. Irey asserted a lien 
against the machine to secure payment of the 
amounts he claimed, and kept the machine. 
On April 25, 1985, Chromalox sued respo-
ndents, requesting a writ of attachment on the 
machine. The court granted Chromalox's writ, 
and ordered that the machine should be taken 
from I.E.M.'s facility and stored in a storage 
unit under the control of the Salt Lake County 
sheriff. Respondents moved to quash the writ 
and answered Chromalox's complaint. On 
November 6, 1985, Chromalox filed an 
amended complaint, requesting the return of 
the machine, $81,868.87 in damages, reason-
able attorney fees and costs, and $20,000 in 
punitive damages. Respondents assened a 
counterclaim, demanding $186,817 in 
damages. 
On February 5, 1986, Chromalox moved for 
summary judgment, raising the issue that Irey 
was prevented from seeking relief through 
Utah courts, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§58-22-20 (1963), because he was not 
authorized to practice as an engineer. Irey 
opposed the motion, indicating that Joseph 
Undsey, a licensed professional engineer, had 
been on LE.M.'s staff at all relevant times, 
and that Robert Onffin, also a licensed prof-
essional engineer, had done engineering work 
on the machine. The court denied Chrom-
alox's motion. 
A jury trial was held on November 17, 
1987. The jury found in favor of Irey and 
awarded him damages against Chromalox of 
$92,500, accrued interest of $24,281, and costs 
of $649.75. On January 15, 1988, the trial 
court amended the judgment, awarding Irey 
$92,500, $23,895.91 in accrued interest, 
$285.45 in costs, and awarded possession of 
the machine to Chromalox. Chromalox 
brought this appeal. 
The parties raise the following issues on 
appeal: (I) May respondents recover for 
breach of contract, given the engineering lic-
ensing provisions of Utah Code Ann. §58-
22-20 (1963); and (2) did the trial court 
commit reversible error by refusing to give 
Chromalox's requested jury instruction on 
breach of warranty? 
I. 
ENGINEERING LICENSE 
The major issue raised by the parties is 
whether, under the relevant provisions of the 
Engineers' and Surveyors' Licensing Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §58-22-1 to-25 (1963). 
respondents may recover for breach of cont-
ract. ' . , 
Chromalox argues that section 58-22-20' 
bars I.E.M. from seeking any relief through 
the courts because I E.M., through Irey, pra-
cticed engineering in the state of Utah without 
a license. I.E.M., however, argues that it Is 
not precluded from enforcing its contract 
because: (1) Chromalox is not a member of 
the protected class, the lay public, but rather, 
Chromalox is an industrial manufacturer 
which sells only to industrial and commercial 
users; (2) Irejf believed that he was acting in 
compliance with the statute by hiring licensed 
engineers to work on the Chromalox project; 
and (3) there is evidence upon which the jury 
could reasonably conclude that the machine 
worked. ' *' 
At the outset, we note that the record 
clearly indicates Irey practiced engineering in 
the state of Utah without a license. Relevant 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §58-22-2 
(1963) define the practice of engineering as: 
the performance of any professional 
service or creative work requiring 
engineering education, training and 
experience, and the application of 
special knowledge of the mathem-
atical, physical, and engineering 
sciences to such professional serv-
ices or creative work as consulta-
tion, investigation, evaluation, 
planning, design, and supervision of 
construction for the purpose of 
assuring compliance with specific-
ations and design, in connection 
with the utilization of the forces, 
energies, and materials of nature in 
the development, production, and 
functioning of engineering proce-
sses, apparatus, machines, equip-
ment, ... employed in or devoted to 
public or private enterprise or uses. 
Similarly, the term 'practice of engineering* 
'comprehends the practice of those branches 
of engineering, the pursuit of any of which 
affects the safety of life, health or property, 
or the public welfare.* Utah Code Ann. §58-
22-2 (1963). By designing and constructing 
the machine, Irey unquestionably engaged in 
creative work and professional services requi-
ring application of the physical and enginee-
ring sciences. It is undisputed, also, that Irey 
was not licensed according to the terms of the 
statute. He held no other engineering license 
or college degree, and had not engaged in any 
formal engineering education. 
Section 58-22-2 further states that: 
Pacific 
(a] person shall be construed to 
practice or offer to practice engin-
eering, within the meaning and 
intent of this act* ... who holds 
himself out as able to perform, or 
who does perform any engineering 
service or work or any other prof-
essional service designated by the 
practitioner or recognized by educ-
ational authorities as engineering. 
The evidence on the record warrants the inf-
erence that key held himself out as being able 
to perform certain engineering services, so, 
under this provision, he should be construed 
to have practiced engineering during the rele-
vant times. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-22-21 (1963) lists 
the circumstances under which a practitioner 
might be exempted from the licensing requir-
ement. The only arguably applicable exemp-
tion to the licensing requirement is contained 
In section 58-22-21(4). which states: 
This act shall not be construed to 
prevent or apply to ... The work of 
an employee or a subordinate of a 
person holding a certificate of reg-
istration under this act, or an 
employee of a person exempted 
from registration by this section; 
provided such work does not 
include responsible charge of design 
or supervision.... 
The facts dearly establish that lrey was not 
merely an employee or subordinate of 
Undsey, but that they collaborated on an 
equal basis, and that lrey had primary respo-
nsibility for design and manufacturing of the 
machine. Thus, this section is not applicable, 
and lrey is not exempt from the licensing 
requirement. 
Because lrey practiced engineering as 
defined by the Act and is not exempted from 
its provisions, he comes under it* provisions, 
including section 58-22-20 which states, in 
relevant part, that: 
(n)o person shall bring or maintain 
any action in the courts of this state 
for enforcement of any contract or 
the recovery of any sums due In 
connection with the practice of 
engineering or land surveying in this 
state as defined herein, without 
alleging and proving that he was 
duly authorized to practice under 
the provisions of this act....» 
There is no Utah case law specifically inte-
rpreting this provision or other, similar prov-
isions. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated, regarding the status of unlicensed 
practitioners, that: 
(i]f the purpose of licensing is to 
protect the public, then the general 
»x Division v. lrey cooe.co 
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I rule in this State is that the party 
| w h o does not obtain a l icense, but 
I is required to d o s o , cannot obtain 
I relief to enforce the term* of his 
I contract — Including payment 
I thereunder - even though there 
I are other penalties imposed against 
I him expressly by statute including 
I criminal sanctions. : 
j George v. Orcu Ltd. 4 Assocs.. 672 P.2d 732, 
735 (Utah 1983) (quoting Fillmore Prods., Inc. 
v. Western States Paving. Inc. , 561 P.2d 687, 
689 (Utah 1977)) (emphasis In original); see 
I also Heber VAlley Truck, Inc. v. Utah Coal A 
Energy. Inc., 611 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah 1980); 
Mosley v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 
149, 152 (1969); Smith v. American Packing A 
Provision Co., 102 Utah 351 , 130 P .2d 9 5 1 . 
957 (1943). This general rule was adopted in 
I connection with licensing statutes which did 
not specifically provide, as does section 58-22-
20 , that an unlicensed practitioner cannot 
I maintain an action in the state's courts t o 
I enforce the terms o f his contracts. See eg.. 
I Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp.. 681 P .2d 1227, 
1229 (Utah 1984). Because section 58-22-20 
I only states explicitly what the general rule has 
I been held to be, we interpret the statute con-
sistently with the case law which has developed 
I under the general rule. 
I The general rule is not applied unconditio-
I nally, but only under circumstances in which 
I the 'party from w h o m the contractor seeks to 
] recover is in the class the legislature intended 
to protect." Ligneli v. Berg, 593 P 2d 800, 805 
(Utah 1979); see also George, 672 P 2d at 735; 
Heber Valley Truck, Inc., 611 P.2d at 391. 
The purpose behind taking this approach is to 
I avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures 
which g o , not to the state, but to repudiating 
defendants. Fillmore Prods.. Inc. v. Western 
States Paving, Inc., 561 P 2d 687 , 689 (Utah 
1977); see also Loader, 681 P.2d at 1229; Heber 
Valley Truck, Inc., 611 P .2d at 391; LigneU. 593 
P . 2 d at 8 0 5 . t a w s i n t e n d e d for 
I protecting the public are not intended to 
become "an unwarranted shield for the avoi-
I dance of a just obligation/ Fillmore Prods.. 
561 P 2d at 690 (quoting Matchett v. Gould, 
131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 281 P.2d 524 (1955)) 
I and should not alio* a "defendant to take the 
I benefit of an unlicensed plaintiff's labor and 
I refuse to pay for it." Heber Valley Truck, 
Inc. 6UP2dat391. 
I "A litigant is not a member of [the class the 
I legislature intended to protect) if the required 
I protection ... U in fact afforded by another 
J means," Ligneli. 593 P.2d at 805, such as the 
I litigant bang licensed in the same trade or 
I profession as the unlicensed practitioner. See 
e.g.. Heber Valley Truck, Inc.. 611 P 2d at 
391-92; UgncU, 592 P 2d at 805; Fillmore 
Prods., 561 P 2d at 689. In Fillmore Products. 
I a licensed contractor w h o contracted for ser-
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vices with an unlicensed contractor was not 
allowed t o invoke the general rule prohibiting 
the unlicensed contractor from initiating an 
action for payment because the unlicensed 
contractor's work had met all the requirem-
ents and specifications o f the general contract 
and the entire project was under the supervi-
sion o f a licensed project engineer. Fillmore 
Prods.. 561 P.2d at 689; see also Heber Valley 
Truck. Inc.. 611 P .2d at 391-92. In Loader I 
v. Scott Construction Corp., the Utah I 
Supreme Court found that the defendant from I 
w h o m the unlicensed contractor demanded I 
payment was a licensed contractor, s o did not I 
belong to the class o f persons the general rule I 
was Intended to protect, the lay public , 1 
because he was presumed to possess expertise I 
in the contracting business which would enable I 
him t o protect himself. Loader, 681 P .2d at I 
1229. Significantly, the defendant did not I 
complain at trial that the unlicensed contra- I 
ctor's work was unsatisfactory, so the court I 
assumed that the contractor's performance I 
met the defendant's expectations. Id Ult im- I 
ately, the court found in favor o f the unlice- I 
nsed contractor because (1) the defendant was I 
not a member o f the class the statute was I 
intended to protect, (2) the unlicensed contr- I 
actor fully performed the contract and the I 
defendant would be unfairly benefitted by I 
avoiding payment, and (3) the unlicensed I 
contractor's unlicensed status was the result o f I 
a good faith mistake. Id. at 1230. I 
This court will reverse a judgment based ] 
upon a jury verdict only if, "viewing the cvi- I 
dence in the light most favorable t o the I 
verdict, there u n o substantial evidence to I 
support it." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. I 
781 P 2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re 
Estate ofKesler. 702 P 2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985)). 
Where there is conflicting evidence, "we I 
assume that the jury believed those facts that I 
support its verdict ..., and we view the facts I 
and the reasonable inferences that arise from I 
those facts in a light most supportive o f the 1 
jury's verdict." Canyon Country Store, 781 I 
P.2d at 417 (quoting Bennion v. LeGrand I 
Johnson Constr. Co, 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 
(Utah 1985)). 
In the present case, the Chromalox emplo- I 
yees involved with the project were either lie- I 
ensed engineers or working under the direction I 
o f licensed engineers. N e d Blackett was a lie- I 
ensed engineer, as was Charles Ashburn, a I 
manufacturing engineer w h o assisted lrey with I 
design. Mark C o y , the primary Chromalox 1 
engineer on the project, was an engineering I 
student working under Blackett's direction. I 
Under Loader. Chromalox is, thus, presumed I 
to possess expertise in engineering so "is not in I 
need o f the protection the licensing statute was I 
intended to provide to the lay public." Loader, I 
681 P 2d at 122SM Al though substantially 
controverted, the record further contains cvt- I 
dence from which the jury could conclude that 
K Division v. lrey «* 
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the machine worked according to the required 
specifications as revised by Chromalox.1 l ik-
ewise, although lrey was not in compliance 
with the licensing statute, the record contains 
evidence from which the jury could conclude 
that lrey was engaged in A good faith effort to 
comply with the statute. See footnote 2. 
- We conclude that Chromalox Is not si 
member of the legislatively protected dass and 
that, under these facts, preventing lrey from 
bringing his action against Chromalox would 
result in an unreasonable forfeiture. We, the-
refore, find that" I.E.M. may recover for 
breach of contraa under the provisions of 
section 58-22-20, and affirm the trial 
court's judgment. 
O. Jury Instructions 
Chromalox demands reversal of the jury 
verdict, alleging that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by excluding its requested 
breach of warranty instruction. • »-* . • 
Chromalox's attorney submitted the fol lo-
wing jury instruction, which the trial court 
declined to give: 
Under the written agreement 
entered into on November 2, 1982, 
the defendant specifically agreed to 
produce a machine for $69,896.00 
plus sales tax, which would produce 
400 accepted bolt to coil terminals 
of diameter .06 to .115", coil length 
of 2" to 48," |sic] from wire gauges 
from 20 to 32, continuous service, 
convenient servicing and adjustment 
and/or replacing of components. 
This agreement warrants and binds 
the defendant to make a machine 
which would accomplish these spe-
cific functions. 
In the event the defendant failed 
to produce a machine which would 
specifically meet each of the funct-
ions successfully, he would be in 
breach of his promise or warranty 
and the plaintiff would be entitled 
to its damages. 
Instead, the trial court gave the following 
instruction, in relevant part: 
The plaintiff alleges defendant 
made them a written offer to build 
the plaintiff a machine that would 
do specific things in a set time 
frame. The plaintiff further alleges 
that the plaintiff accepted the 
written offer in writing and has. In 
fact, paid in full for the machine. 
The plaintiff alleges that defendant 
has had more time than a reason' 
able time to perform, and that the 
plaintiffs now have the machine and 
it is not as ordered and is in fact 
worthless. Plaintiffs therefore claim 
that they are entitled to have their 
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and that defendants had not successfully 
produced the machine. Because the instruction 
implied that these issues had already been 
decided, we find that the court appropriately 
exercised its discretion because the instruction 
could have misled the jury to respondents' 
prejudice. We, therefore, find Chromalox's 
argument to be without merit. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Regnal W. Chuff, Judge 
monies returned plus damages they 
have suffered because of the breach 
of contract. The plaintiff further 
alleges that even if the jury were to 
find it to be a fact (which plaintiff 
denies) that plaintiff; (sic) damaged 
the machine, requested additional 
features be placed on the machine, 
or requested a machine that would 
handle previously unanticipated 
imperfections in the coils and 
washers, that the defendant has still 
had adequate time in which to 
perform; and that they are therefore 
entitled to most of their money 
back, as well as damages for breach 
of contract. 
The remainder of this instruction set forth 
I.E.M.'s theory of the case and submitted the 
allegations of fact to the jury for its determi-
nation. Subsequent to the trial court's charge 
to the jury, Chromalox's counsel objected to 
the trial court's failure to give its requested 
instruction, stating: 
One of our causes of action is for 
breach of warranty. There's no 
instruction in here concerning 
breach of warranty for the jury to 
rule on. So we except to it, the 
lacking of this instruction. We 
submitted one to the court on 
breach of warranty 
The court allowed Chromalox's exception, 
but stated that it would go with the instruct-
ions as outlined because it believed that 
"comment on some specific items would-
that are requested would actually constitute a 
comment on the evidence. The court believes 
these matters are open to argument." 
It is the trial court's duty to cover both 
parties' theories and points of law in giving 
jury instructions, provided that there is com-
petent evidence to support them. Power v. 
Gene's Bldg. Materials, inc., 567 P.2d 174, 
176 (Utah 1977); Black v. McXnighl, 562 P 2d 
621, 622 (Utah 1977); Newsom v. Gold Cross 
Serv., Inc., 779 P.2d 692. 694 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). However, the trial court may properly 
refuse to give instructions if they do not acc-
urately reflect the law governing the factual 
situation of the case. Black, 562 P.2d at 622, 
or if they tend to mislead the jury to the pre-
judice of the complaining party or erroneously 
advise on the law. Sec Mikkelson v. Haslam, 
764 P.2d 1384.1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Upon review of the record and Chromalox's 
requested instruction, we agree with the trial I 
court. The requested instruction set forth as I 
fact two controverted issues: that defendants I 
had actually and specifically agreed to the I 
terms set forth in the instruction, which corr- I 
esponded with the original purchase order I 
rather than the alleged changes which evolved I 
over the course of production of the machine; I 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench. Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Under the new version of the comparable statute, 
*(a) person who is not licensed under the provisions 
of this chapter may not bring or maintain any 
action in the courts of this state for enforcement of 
any contract or the recovery of any sums due in 
connection with the practice of engineering ... in 
this state." This statute was enacted by ch. 24,1986 
Utah Laws, effective. April 28. 1986, which repealed 
the former sections 58-22-1 to-22 as enacted by 
ch. 118. 1955 Utah Laws. Because the events leading 
to this appeal occurred from 1982 to 1985. prior to 
the effective date of the new statute, the old version 
applies. 
2. Although the focus under Loader is solely on 
whether the parry refusing payment has the very 
expertise which the licensing statute is designed to 
insure, we note that the possibility of any actual 
harm in this case was also greatly mi«t«*i™t by the 
availability of engineering expertise to Irey. In 
addition to Chromalox's in-house expertise, 
several registered engineers worked on, approved, 
and certified the project design for I.E.M. Joseph 
W. Lindsey, a licensed engineer, regularly consulted 
with l.EM. on various projects, including Chrom-
alox's machine, prior to and during the manufact-
uring stages. He routinely reviewed Irey's designs 
and suggested whatever modifications he fdt were 
required to make better use of the materials or to 
strengthen the machine. Although Lindsey was not 
an officer or employee of I E M . he was a stockh-
older, and was involved with the Chromalox project 
at virtually every step, spending about 140 hours on 
it. He worked on the preliminary design, the design 
of the frame, and the running of tests and analyses 
on the machine to assure that it was sound. He 
certified the machine design and contracted to have 
the machine built in his machine shop. Irey also 
employed Robert M. Oriffln. a registered professi-
onal engineer, to perform computations and stress 
analyses on the rnachuu. Oriffln testified that Irey's 
design was more than adequate and was capable of 
operating safely and reliably from a mechanical 
standpoint. Irey additionally engaged Robert Kirk, 
also a registered engineer, to design the computer 
and software packages. 
3. We note here that 
(tlhe question on appeal from a judg-
ment based on a jury verdict is not 
whether mere Is substantial evidence 
which would have supported a contrary 
verdict, or even whether tab Court, had 
it been trier of fact, would have reached 
the same verdict as that reached by the 
jury Rather, the issue is whether the 
jury's findings are supported by subst-
Cooa*Co State T. Davis 
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antial competent evidence. 
Canyon Country Store, 7g| P.2d at 418 (quoting la 
ft Estate ofKeskr, 702 F 2d 86,95 (Utah 1985)). 
Qtaas 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant David Davis was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance without 
the required tax stamps affixed, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §59-
19-105 (1988). Defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss the charge, claiming that section 59-
19-105 of the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act" U 
unconstitutional. The trial court denied his 
motion and consequently defendant entered a 
conditional plea of no contest. 
Defendant argues on appeal that (1) the 
Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act violates his privi-
lege against sdf-wcrimination under the fifth 
amendment of the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constit-
ution; and (2) the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act 
Is void for vagueness under the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. We affirm. 
A constitutional challenge to a statute pre-
sents a question of law, and thus, we review 
the trial court's conclusion, that the Utah 
Drug Stamp Tax Act is constitutional, for 
correctness. See Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 
P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989); Provo City Corp. 
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); see 
also Scharf v. BMO Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). • 
Furthermore, we recognize that it is the 
prerogative of the legislature to create the law. 
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 
1981). Thus, we afford the legislature's ena-
ctments a presumption of validity. Id.; 
Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 
1974); Pride Club. Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 
333. 481 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1971). We will 
not strike down a statute unless it appears to 
be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; Pride Oub, 
481 P.2d at 670. Nor will we declare a statute 
unconstitutional if we can find any reasonable 
basis to bring it within a constitutional fram-
ework. Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; State v. 
Packard. 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561. 563 
(Utah 1952). 
I. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 
Defendant contends the Utah Drug Stamp 
Tax Act requires him to incriminate himself in' 
violation of the fifth amendment of the United 
States Constitution.* He asserts that proof he 
purchased and posted the stamps could be 
used to provide a link in the chain of evidence 
in a subsequent drug prosecution against him. 
Defendant claims that the mere purchase of 
the stamps is an admission of criminal beha-
vior because the law only applies to individ-
uals unlawfully in possession of controlled 
substances.' 
The state argues, on the other hand, that 
the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act does not 
require stamp purchasers to identify themse-
lves or even to appear in person to pay the tax 
and obtain the stamps.4 Thus, the state claims 
the tax commission, under the Utah statutory 
scheme, receives no incriminating information 
to disclose to prosecutors. 
The United States Supreme Court has long 
held that the government may tax illegal acti-
vities. See License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471-
73, 18 L. Ed. 497, 501 (1867); MarchetU v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 39. 44 (1968). 
However, the government may not establish a 
method of taxation that violates the fifth 
amendment. Id. at 44. In order to evaluate 
defendant's claims, we first review the scope 
of protection afforded by the fifth amendment 
and then focus on prior decisions discussing 
the relationship between taxes levied on illegal 
activities and the constitutional privilege 
against sdf-mcrimination. 
The fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 0No person shall be ... 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself ....* This right arises when the 
government requests information that will 
subject a person to criminal liability, Garner 
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648. 655 (1976), 
and applies to compelled written as well as 
oral testimony. Albertson v. Subversive Acti-
vities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965); 
State v. Durrani. 244 Kan. 522, 769 P.2d 
1174, 1179, cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 3254 
